diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst | 6 |
3 files changed, 9 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index 32a8893e5617..cce768afec6b 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ Spectre variant 2 -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options. If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option. The kernel config - CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with - the latest updated microcode. + CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs + to run with the latest updated microcode. On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all, cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details. @@ -609,8 +609,8 @@ kernel command line. Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a mitigation method at run time according to the CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the - CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the - compiler with which the kernel was built. + CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option, + and the compiler with which the kernel was built. Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation against user space to user space task attacks. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 31b3a25680d0..f42618b95825 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -6027,8 +6027,8 @@ Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a mitigation method at run time according to the CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the - CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the - compiler with which the kernel was built. + CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option, + and the compiler with which the kernel was built. Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation against user space to user space task attacks. diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst index e08d35177bc0..57e8392f61d3 100644 --- a/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst +++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst @@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ comments in pti.c). This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging the paging structures do not function when PTI is enabled. It can be -enabled by setting CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile time. -Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with the -'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt). +enabled by setting CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile +time. Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with +the 'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt). Page Table Management ===================== |