mm: kfence: disable KMSAN when checking the canary

KMSAN warns about check_canary() accessing the canary.

The reason is that, even though set_canary() is properly instrumented and
sets shadow, slub explicitly poisons the canary's address range
afterwards.

Unpoisoning the canary is not the right thing to do: only check_canary()
is supposed to ever touch it.  Instead, disable KMSAN checks around canary
read accesses.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-20-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions