Merge tag 'cxl-fixes-6.5-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl

Pull cxl fixes from Vishal Verma:

 - Fixup the Sanitixe device ABI that was merged for v6.5 to hide some
   sysfs files when the necessary support is missing. Update the ABI
   documentation around this as well.

* tag 'cxl-fixes-6.5-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl:
  cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported
  cxl/memdev: Document security state in kern-doc
  cxl/memdev: Improve sanitize ABI descriptions

4 files changed, 92 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
index 6350dd82b9a9..087f762ebfd5 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
@@ -82,7 +82,12 @@ Description:
 		whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity,
 		or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means
 		is appropriate for the media type. This functionality requires
-		the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges.
+		the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any
+		HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
+		management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
+		transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
+		states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware
+		support for the operation.
 
 
 What            /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
@@ -92,7 +97,13 @@ Contact:        linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
 Description:
 		(WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
 		secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for
-		all user data areas of the device.
+		all user data areas of the device. This functionality requires
+		the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any
+		HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
+		management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
+		transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
+		states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware
+		support for the operation.
 
 
 What:		/sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
index d6d067fbee97..ca60bb8114f2 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
@@ -121,6 +121,45 @@ static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static void cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled(struct cxl_security_state *security,
+					 u16 opcode)
+{
+	switch (opcode) {
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE, security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK, security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 static bool cxl_is_poison_command(u16 opcode)
 {
 #define CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS 0x43
@@ -677,7 +716,8 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
 		u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode);
 		struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode);
 
-		if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command(opcode)) {
+		if (!cmd && (!cxl_is_poison_command(opcode) ||
+			     !cxl_is_security_command(opcode))) {
 			dev_dbg(dev,
 				"Opcode 0x%04x unsupported by driver\n", opcode);
 			continue;
@@ -689,6 +729,9 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
 		if (cxl_is_poison_command(opcode))
 			cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(&mds->poison, opcode);
 
+		if (cxl_is_security_command(opcode))
+			cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled(&mds->security, opcode);
+
 		dev_dbg(dev, "Opcode 0x%04x enabled\n", opcode);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
index f99e7ec3cc40..14b547c07f54 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
@@ -477,9 +477,28 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = {
 	.attrs = cxl_memdev_pmem_attributes,
 };
 
+static umode_t cxl_memdev_security_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
+					   struct attribute *a, int n)
+{
+	struct device *dev = kobj_to_dev(kobj);
+	struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
+	struct cxl_memdev_state *mds = to_cxl_memdev_state(cxlmd->cxlds);
+
+	if (a == &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr &&
+	    !test_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE, mds->security.enabled_cmds))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (a == &dev_attr_security_erase.attr &&
+	    !test_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE, mds->security.enabled_cmds))
+		return 0;
+
+	return a->mode;
+}
+
 static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_security_attribute_group = {
 	.name = "security",
 	.attrs = cxl_memdev_security_attributes,
+	.is_visible = cxl_memdev_security_visible,
 };
 
 static const struct attribute_group *cxl_memdev_attribute_groups[] = {
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
index 499113328586..706f8a6d1ef4 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
+++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
@@ -244,6 +244,19 @@ enum poison_cmd_enabled_bits {
 	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX
 };
 
+/* Device enabled security commands */
+enum security_cmd_enabled_bits {
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX
+};
+
 /**
  * struct cxl_poison_state - Driver poison state info
  *
@@ -346,6 +359,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {
  * struct cxl_security_state - Device security state
  *
  * @state: state of last security operation
+ * @enabled_cmds: All security commands enabled in the CEL
  * @poll: polling for sanitization is enabled, device has no mbox irq support
  * @poll_tmo_secs: polling timeout
  * @poll_dwork: polling work item
@@ -353,6 +367,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {
  */
 struct cxl_security_state {
 	unsigned long state;
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(enabled_cmds, CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX);
 	bool poll;
 	int poll_tmo_secs;
 	struct delayed_work poll_dwork;
@@ -434,6 +449,7 @@ struct cxl_dev_state {
  * @next_persistent_bytes: persistent capacity change pending device reset
  * @event: event log driver state
  * @poison: poison driver state info
+ * @security: security driver state info
  * @fw: firmware upload / activation state
  * @mbox_send: @dev specific transport for transmitting mailbox commands
  *